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improvements to the land, such as buildings.
The opinions expressed by Nobel Prize winners
Milton Friedman and William Vickrey are at the
root of proposals to differentiate the taxing of
land from the buildings on that land. Such pro-
posals have attracted increasing attention from
researchers and policymakers in Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Virginia, and Pennsylvania in
recent years.1
The two-rate proposal is a modification of
the extreme case in which the only tax levied is
on the value of land. Taxes on the value of build-
ings, as well as all other taxes, would be zero.
Thus, the owners of buildings would no longer
pay a property tax; only the owners of land would
be taxed. Such a pure land tax approach was
advocated by Henry George in a book published
in 1879, Progress and Poverty. He argued that
land should be taxed at 100 percent of its “rental
value.”2 George reasoned that the land value tax
“In my opinion, the least bad tax is the property
tax on the unimproved value of land, the Henry
George argument of many, many years ago.”
—Milton Friedman, 
as quoted in Mankiw (2004), 
1976 Nobel Prize laureate in economics.
“The property tax is, economically speaking, a
combination of one of the worst taxes—the part
that is assessed on real estate improvements…
and one of the best taxes—the tax on land or
site value.” 
—William Vickrey (1999), 
1996 Nobel Prize laureate in economics.
R
evenues from the taxation of real
property play a key, and frequently
controversial, role in the funding of
elementary and secondary education
as well as many other publicly provided services.
Our focus is on one suggested improvement of
property taxation known as “two-rate” or “split-
rate” taxation. When taxing a specific parcel of
real property in the United States, the same rate
is usually applied to the land as well as to the
When taxing real property at the local level in the United States, land and improvements to the
land, such as buildings, are generally taxed at the same rate. Two-rate (or split-rate) taxation departs
from this practice by taxing land at a higher rate than structures. This paper begins with an elemen-
tary discussion of taxation and the economic rationale for two-rate taxation. In theory, moving to
a two-rate tax reduces the deadweight losses associated with distortionary taxation and generates
additional economic activity. The paper also provides a history of two-rate taxation in the United
States and a summary of studies attempting to quantify its economic effects. Discussions of the
practical and political challenges of implementing two-rate taxation complete the paper.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, May/June 2005, 87(3), pp. 359-74.
1 Craig (2003) notes that over 700 cities worldwide use two-rate
taxation of property.
2 O’Sullivan (2003, p. 154) defines land rent as “the annual payment
in exchange for the right to use the land.”
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          would increase efficiency (and the wealth of
society) by allowing governments to abolish taxes
on improvements to land, as well as eliminate
all other forms of taxation. He also cited equity
reasons for the “single tax” on land.3 Namely,
increases in land value (exclusive of improve-
ments) in the early 1900s were due primarily to
an entire community’s private-sector and public-
sector economic activities rather than the actions
of the specific land owner. Therefore, George
argued, land owners should not benefit dispro-
portionately from city growth, and the tax on
land would allow for the redistribution of these
unearned gains.4
A pure land tax, however, is not without some
faults. First, it is not easy to measure the value of
land net of improvements, and this would make it
difficult for government to determine the amount
of the land tax. This shortcoming of the pure land
tax would also be present with the two-rate tax.
Second, if a pure land tax were to capture all
current and future rent from the landowners, the
market value of the land would become zero. This
would be equivalent to the government taking the
land from landowners. Thus, people would have
no incentive to hold land, leading to abandon-
ment of the land, and likely resulting in govern-
mental decisions about how the land should be
used and by whom. Third, the change to a pure
land tax would likely have significant redistribu-
tional effects, with large landowners likely incur-
ring substantial adverse wealth effects. This effect,
however, might be viewed by some as a virtue
rather than a fault.
Compared with the pure land tax, the two-rate
tax on land and buildings is a more general and,
perhaps, more practical alternative. Instead of
taxing land and structures at the same rate, as is
the case with the conventional property tax, the
two-rate tax would tax land at a higher rate than
the structures on the land. This form of the tax
would encourage improvements on relatively
small lots of land because such improvements
would be taxed at a lower rate than the land itself.
The increased incentive for improving structures
would lead to increased economic development.
In the context of urban economic development,
such a tax policy might reverse the trend of eco-
nomic decay experienced by some cities. More-
over, because the tax rate on land using a two-rate
tax would be less than the tax rate using a pure
land tax, the potentially large changes in land
prices would be mitigated somewhat. Thus, the
size of adverse wealth effects would be reduced,
which might help in reaching a political agreement
to support a two-rate system.
In the next section, we provide an introduction
to taxation. This general introduction provides
the foundation for a discussion of land taxation
and the two-rate tax. A history of two-rate taxation
in the United States follows this discussion. Two-
rate taxation has been used in Pennsylvania, most
notably in Pittsburgh. Next, we review a number
of studies attempting to quantify the effects of two-
rate taxation. These studies include a case study
of Pittsburgh as well as studies attempting to iden-
tify the potential effects of various tax-change
proposals. This discussion is followed by an elab-
oration of the practical problems of implement-
ing two-rate taxation. A summary of the political
economy issues involved in land value taxation
completes the body of our paper. 
THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF 
TAXATION USING DEMAND AND
SUPPLY CURVES5
Demand and supply curves can be used to
illustrate how taxes affect the behavior and the
economic well-being of consumers and producers.
The effect of taxation is one of the topics in what
economists refer to as welfare economics. Before
Cohen and Coughlin
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3 George used the term “single tax” because he thought that a tax
on unimproved land could yield sufficient revenues to finance all
government spending. While his thinking was appropriate for the
late nineteenth century, the revenue potential of land taxation is
far less than the size of public spending today.
4 A discussion of the ethical arguments involving land taxation
(i.e., Is such a tax just?) can be found in Fischel (1998) and Bromley
(1998).
5 Readers familiar with this material might want to proceed directly
to the next section on land taxation. For readers desiring an elabo-
ration of the material in this section, see Chapters 6 through 8 in
Mankiw (2004).analyzing the effects of a specific tax, we must
first introduce the concepts of consumer surplus,
producer surplus, and efficiency.
Consumer Surplus
We begin by using a demand curve to meas-
ure consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is the
amount that buyers are willing to pay for a good
minus the amount they actually pay for it.
Figure 1 shows a hypothetical demand curve.
Assuming a price per unit of P1, buyers would
purchase Q1 units of this good. Thus, the total
expenditure by consumers on this good would be
P1 times Q1 or, in terms of an area, the rectangle
OP1BQ1. 
The demand curve reveals how much con-
sumers are willing to pay for the Q1 units. Moving
rightward on the quantity axis from the origin,
the value that consumers are willing to pay is
reflected by the height of the demand curve. This
reflects the assumption that the first unit is valued
the most by consumers, the second unit somewhat
less, and so on as one moves down the demand
curve. Thus, the total amount that consumers are
willing to pay for the Q1 units is equal to the area
of the four-sided figure OABQ1. The difference
between what consumers are willing to pay and
what they actually pay (i.e., consumer surplus)
is represented by the triangular area P1AB.
Producer Surplus
Turning to the supply side of this market, the
concept of producer surplus can be illustrated
using a supply curve. Producer surplus is the
difference between actual compensation received
by sellers for a given quantity of output (i.e., total
revenue) and the minimum compensation sellers
would require to provide that given quantity.
Figure 2 shows a hypothetical supply curve.
The positive slope of the supply curve reflects
the assumption that the compensation to induce
additional units of production increases as output
increases. Assuming a price per unit of P2, pro-
ducers would supply Q2 units of this good. Thus,
the total revenue would be P2 times Q2 or the area
of the rectangle OP2CQ2.
The minimum compensation necessary to
induce producers to supply Q2 is revealed by the
supply curve. Moving rightward on the quantity
axis from the origin, the minimum compensation
is reflected by the height of the supply curve.
Thus, the minimum compensation for Q2 units
is equal to the four-sided area ODCQ2. The differ-
ence between the total revenue of producers and
the minimum they must receive to produce (i.e.,
Cohen and Coughlin























Supply and Producer Surplusproducer surplus) is represented by the triangular
area DP2C.
In equilibrium, the quantity consumers are
willing to buy equals the quantity producers are
willing to supply. The competitive equilibrium
shown in Figure 3 reflects what economists term
“economic efficiency.” One key implication of
economic efficiency is that total economic surplus,
which is the sum of consumer and producer sur-
plus, cannot be increased by either increasing or
decreasing the output of this good. Increased out-
put would cause the additional cost incurred by
sellers to exceed the additional value to buyers,
while decreased output would cause the addi-
tional value to buyers to exceed the additional
cost incurred by sellers.
Effects of Taxes
Now let’s examine the effect of taxes on this
market. Taxes impose a wedge between what
consumers pay and what producers receive.
Assume a tax of $1 per unit is levied on buyers
of a particular good. Such a tax can be illustrated
by shifting the demand curve downward by the
size of the tax because consumers only care about
their out-of-pocket expense in determining a
desired quantity. This is shown in Figure 4 by
the shift in demand from Demand0 to Demand1.
The new equilibrium quantity is Q1, which is less
than the original equilibrium of quantity of output.
At Q1, the price per unit received by producers
is Pp and the price paid by consumers is Pc. The
difference in these two prices is $1, which is the
amount per unit received by the taxing authority.6
Note that, despite the fact that the tax is levied
on consumers, both consumers and producers
bear the burden of the tax. Consumers incur a
reduction in consumer surplus because they are
now paying a higher price per unit for a reduced
quantity. Meanwhile, producers incur a reduction
in producer surplus because they are now receiv-
ing a lower price per unit and producing less.
Does it matter in this case if producers had
been taxed $1 per unit of output rather than taxing
consumers $1 for every unit they purchased? The
answer is no. This possibly surprising result is
shown in Figure 5. Because the tax increases pro-
duction costs by $1 per unit, the supply curve is
shifted upward by the size of the tax. Once again,
the difference between the price paid by con-
sumers, Pc, and the net price received by pro-
ducers, Pp, is $1. This tax wedge is identical to
Cohen and Coughlin
































Effects of a Tax Levied on Consumers
6 To distinguish between the two prices, the price paid by consumers
can be called the gross-of-tax price, while the price received by
producers can be called the net-of-tax price.the tax wedge shown in Figure 4. Consequently,
the equilibrium quantity, Q1, in Figure 5 is the
same quantity as in Figure 4. Given the identical
price faced by consumers and the identical quan-
tity, consumers bear the same burden, regardless
of upon whom the tax is levied. An identical com-
ment can be made concerning the tax burden of
producers.
Taxes and Welfare
Next, let’s examine the welfare consequences
in more detail. Because Figures 4 and 5 generate
identical results, we can simplify the analysis by
not showing the curve that shifts. Figure 6 shows
the same information as Figures 4 and 5. The $1
tax per unit drives a $1 wedge between what con-
sumers pay and producers receive. This $1 per
unit is received by the government as tax revenue.
In Figure 6, tax revenue is represented by the
rectangle PpPcAB (or (Pc – Pp) × Q1). Meanwhile,
the tax imposes burdens on consumers and pro-
ducers. The cost of taxation for consumers and
producers reflects not only the amount paid to
the taxing authority, but also the cost associated
with transactions that no longer occur because the
tax has made them “uneconomic.” This latter
point is due to the fact that, in nearly all cases,
taxation causes consumers and producers to
change their behavior.
The tax burden for consumers is the reduction
in consumer surplus. Due to the higher price and
the reduced consumption, this loss is the four-
sided area P0PcAE. The tax burden for producers
is the reduction in producer surplus. Due to the
lower price and the reduced production, this
loss for producers is the four-sided area PpP0EB.
Note that some of the losses incurred by both
consumers and producers reflect a transfer to the
government.7 Overall, the net decline in national
well-being is the triangle BAE, which is termed
the deadweight loss (DWL) caused by the tax. This
loss reflects the fact that taxation prevents some
mutually beneficial exchanges between consumers
and producers from occurring.
For a given tax, the distribution of the effects
on economic well-being and the size of the DWL
depend on how much quantity demanded and
quantity supplied respond to the change in price
stemming from the tax. A summary measure of
this responsiveness is the price elasticity of
demand (supply). The price elasticity of demand
is the absolute value of the percentage change in
Cohen and Coughlin




































Deadweight Loss of a Tax
7 To simplify the analysis, we have assumed that the government
programs funded by the tax revenues yield benefits that are equal
to the losses incurred by consumers and producers associated with
the tax payments.quantity demanded divided by the percentage
change in price. Larger values of the price elas-
ticity of demand are associated with flatter slopes
of the demand curve; conversely, smaller values
of the price elasticity of demand are associated
with steeper slopes of the demand curve.8,9 The
same terminology and implications for slope are
used for the price elasticity of supply, for which
larger (smaller) values of the price elasticity of
supply are associated with flatter (steeper) slopes
of the supply curve.
The price elasticities of demand and supply
affect the tax burdens imposed on consumers
and producers. Exactly how is straightforward.
Begin by envisioning a clockwise rotation of the
demand curve around point E in Figure 6. In this
case, the price elasticity of demand is becoming
less elastic (more inelastic). With an unchanged
supply curve, as the demand curve becomes less
elastic, the price that consumers pay will rise as
will the price that producers receive. Note that the
tax wedge must remain constant. The end result
is that the tax burden imposed on consumers rises
relative to that of producers. In other words, hold-
ing all other things constant, as the price elasticity
of demand decreases, the tax burden of consumers
rises relative to that of producers.
Similar results occur when the price elasticity
of supply becomes less elastic. With the demand
curve unchanged, as the supply curve becomes
less elastic, the price that producers will receive
falls as will the price that consumers pay. Thus,
the tax burden imposed on producers rises rela-
tive to that of consumers. In summary, as the price
elasticity of demand (supply) decreases, the larger
the relative tax burden of consumers (producers).
The economic intuition underlying this result
is straightforward. In terms of their consumption,
the less responsive consumers are to the higher
price they pay as a result of a tax, the higher their
relative tax burden. In other words, the tax burden
of consumers is relatively more the less they
change their behavior in response to higher prices.
Similar reasoning pertains to producers. In terms
of their production, the less responsive producers
are to the lower (net) price they receive as a result
of a tax, the higher their relative tax burden.
In addition to being related to the tax burdens
of consumers and producers, the price elasticities
of demand and supply affect the DWL of the tax.
A tax creates a DWL because it causes buyers and
sellers to change their consumption and produc-
tion behavior. For a given tax, the larger the price
elasticities of demand and supply, the larger are
the changes in consumption and production.
Thus, larger price elasticities of demand and
supply are associated with larger DWLs.
THE THEORY OF LAND TAXATION
“Tax something, there will be less of it—
except land.” (Harriss, 2003)
Land is different from most other goods.
Namely, proponents of land taxation note that the
supply of (unimproved) land, which is provided
by nature, is fixed. In other words, the supply is
perfectly inelastic. This implies that the supply
curve for land is vertical, as shown in Figure 7.
Recall that a tax on consumers of land (as well as
a tax on consumers of any good, as outlined in the
previous section) will shift the demand curve
downward. Figure 7A shows a decline in demand
from Demand0 to Demand1. Because the supply
curve is vertical, shifting the demand curve down-
ward implies that the new demand curve will
intersect the supply curve at the same quantity
of land as before the land tax (i.e., Q0). As a result,
the intersection of the new demand curve and
supply curve will occur at a lower net-of-tax
equilibrium price than before the land tax (i.e.,
P1 rather than P0)—with no change in the equi-
librium quantity of land. Further, note that the
gross-of-tax price, P0, is identical to the price in
the absence of the tax. The land tax has no effect
on the allocation of productive resources. The
8 The price elasticity of demand at a specific point on a demand
curve, for instance (P0,Q0), is equal to the absolute value of P0/Q0
times ∆Q/∆P. The latter term is the inverse of the slope of the
demand curve. If a demand curve were to become flatter (steeper),
the value of ∆Q/∆P would increase (decrease). Thus, the price
elasticity of demand increases (decreases).
9 Economists refer to increasing values of the price elasticity of
demand (supply) as being “more elastic” or “less inelastic” and
decreasing values as being “less elastic” or “more inelastic.”
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of the tax and there is no DWL with this land tax.10
A property tax on buildings, however, alters
or distorts behavior away from that which would
take place in a competitive economy without
taxes. As seen in Figure 7B, because higher prices
encourage producers to supply additional build-
ings, the supply curve for buildings slopes up-
ward. The demand curve slopes downward for
the same reason that the demand curve for land
slopes downward—higher prices result in a
decrease in the quantity of buildings demanded.
A tax on consumers of buildings causes the
demand curve to shift down by the amount of the
tax. The end result is that some of the burden of
the tax is borne by individuals who produce build-
ings (in the form of lower building prices) and
fewer buildings are consumed in equilibrium.
Thus, relative to the land tax case, the tax on build-
ings distorts behavior, leading to a DWL: The loss
of consumer and producer surplus is greater than
the revenue transferred to the government through
the tax.
Moving from a traditional property tax
(where land and buildings are taxed at one rate)
to a two-rate tax (where land is taxed at a relatively
higher rate) lowers DWL. If a goal is to keep total
tax revenues unchanged, the tax on buildings can
be lowered and the tax on land raised to achieve
a revenue-neutral alternative. As a result, the
distortionary (building) tax is decreased (i.e., in
Figure 7B, the demand curve shifts upward
from Demand1), while the neutral (land) tax is
increased. The overall effect is to lower the DWL.
One way to think of this reduction in DWL is that
a change to a more efficient tax system is equiva-
lent to a tax cut. A given amount of public services
can be provided with a lower local tax burden.
Despite the fact that tax revenues are unchanged,
the tax burden is effectively lowered because of
the decline in DWL. 
A reduction of the DWL associated with the
current system of property taxation, however, is
not the only economic argument that can be
made to support increased tax rates on land and
decreased tax rates on improvements. Mills (1998)
has provided an analysis of the spatial equilib-
rium effects of single taxation. Specifically, Mills
showed how productive activity throughout a
hypothetical metropolitan area would be changed
by a revenue-neutral switch from a conventional
property tax (i.e., one that applies to both build-
ings [capital] and land) to a tax on land only.
The switch causes capital and labor to be substi-
tuted for land. The more intensive use of capital
and labor increases the productivity of each land
Cohen and Coughlin
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10 O’Sullivan (2003, pp. 526-28) presents a somewhat different
exposition of the market effects of land taxation but arrives at the
same outcome that the equilibrium price of land falls by the amount




























Taxing Land versus Taxing Buildingsparcel, which tends to increase gross-of-tax land
prices.11 With agricultural land remaining un-
taxed, the city expands. Due to the increased use
of capital and labor on each land parcel, output
in the metropolitan area expands—in fact, output
increases at every location within the metropolitan
area. Thus, as shown by Brueckner (2001), such
a tax change would lead to denser patterns of land
development and, therefore, inhibit metropolitan
sprawl. Since land in many inner cities is cur-
rently underutilized, such denser land develop-
ment would be desirable.
In a subsequent section of our paper, we take
a closer look at the possible magnitudes of the
economic effects of using two-rate taxation. A
caveat mentioned by Mills is that the adjustment
period associated with such a tax change might
well be very long and require very large, albeit
justified, investments.
TWO-RATE TAXATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
Because real property taxes in the United
States are generally levied by local taxing authori-
ties, most examples of two-rate taxation are at
the local level. The most frequently mentioned
example involves the state of Pennsylvania and,
specifically, the city of Pittsburgh. In 1979-80,
Pittsburgh revamped its property tax system by
raising tax rates on land to more than five times
the rate on structures. From 1913 to 1979-80,
Pittsburgh had a two-rate tax in place, with the
tax rate on buildings being twice the rate on land
(Hartzok, 1997).12 According to the state’s Taxation
Manual (Pennsylvania Department of Community
and Economic Development, 2002), Scranton is
the other city in Pennsylvania that is authorized
to charge lower tax rates on buildings than on
land.13
Although recent state legislation authorized
two local governments in Virginia to implement
a two-rate tax, neither has adopted it (Brunori,
2004). The cities of Fairfax and Roanoke have
the authority to tax property on land at a lower
rate than the corresponding land; however, one
stipulation of the legislation is that the tax on
property may not be zero, thus precluding a pure
land tax.14
A final example involves Hawaii, whose state
legislature passed a two-rate tax in 1963. A major
difference between the Hawaii legislation and
the Pittsburgh legislation, however, is that in
Hawaii the two-rate tax applied to all jurisdictions
(Rybeck, 2000). Legislation in 1978 granted coun-
ties the authority to set their own local property
tax rates. As of fiscal year 2004, though, Kauai
was the only one of Hawaii’s four counties to set
12 The Taxation Manual for Pennsylvania (2002) notes that all property
owners in the state pay property taxes to the municipality, the
corresponding county, and school district. Oates and Schwab (1997)
also note that for the city of Pittsburgh, the presence of these school
district and county property taxes that levy a “conventional property
tax” imply that the net tax rate for land is greater than twice the
rate for structures.
13 Other governmental entities in Pennsylvania, such as third-class
cities, boroughs, and third-class school districts coterminous with
third-class cities, may also use two-rate taxation. For a discussion
of the structure of different local levels of Pennsylvania government,
see section 6 of volume 116 of the Pennsylvania Manual (2003):
www.dgs.state.pa.us/pamanual/lib/pamanual/sec6/section6a.pdf.
14 For a reproduction of the detailed Virginia legislation, see
www.progress.org/cg/roan03.htm.
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Table 1
Mill Rates: Kauai County, Hawaii, Fiscal Year 2004 (July 2003–June 2004)
Single Hotel/
Homestead family Apartment resort Commercial Industrial Agricultural Conservation
Buildings 3.64 4.5 8.15 8.15 8.15 8.15 4.5 4.5
Land 4.35 5.49 8.55 8.55 8.55 8.55 7.95 8.45
SOURCE: Tax Foundation of Hawaii; www.tfhawaii.org/taxes/property.html.
11 Technically speaking, the equilibrium gross-of-tax rent-distance
function rises, while the net-of-tax rent-distance likely falls.higher tax rates for land than for buildings.15 As
can be seen in Table 1, the differences in tax rates
for many property classes for Kauai are small.
EFFECTS OF TWO-RATE 
TAXATION
A number of recent quantitative studies have
examined the effects of implementing two-rate
taxation. Quantitative studies are important for
providing policymakers with estimates of the
potential gains from shifting toward land as a tax
base and some sense of the size of the distribu-
tional issues of such a change. To date, only one
comprehensive study, focused on the conse-
quences for Pittsburgh, has attempted to identify
the actual effects of two-rate taxation. Generally
speaking, existing quantitative studies have
attempted to gauge the hypothetical effects of two-
rate taxation. Some of these latter studies have
focused on the short-run initial effects, while
others have attempted to identify the likely effects
given the economic decisions that would ensue
under the changed tax regime. In other words, the
former studies consider only the initial redistrib-
ution of the property tax burden and, as a result,
do not identify how differential rates on land and
improvements are likely to induce more intensive
use of land.
The Pittsburgh Experience
After Pittsburgh further increased the differ-
ence between the tax rate for land and the tax rate
for buildings in 1979-80, the city experienced a
substantial increase in building activity. Oates
and Schwab (1997) provided suggestive evidence
that Pittsburgh’s change in tax rates played a major
role in stimulating the building boom.16 They
noted that this finding is surprising, however,
because public finance theory suggests that
increasing the land tax while leaving the buildings
tax unchanged should have no effect on build-
ing activity. It is also worth noting, however,
that according to Oates and Schwab, the city of
Pittsburgh granted tax cuts for new building con-
struction. These tax cuts essentially indirectly
lowered the tax rate on new (but not on existing)
buildings.
Suggestive evidence concerning the impact
of Pittsburgh’s change in tax rates is presented in
Table 2, which shows the percentage change in
average annual value of building permits for 15
cities between the two periods 1960-79 and 1980-
89. Excluding Pittsburgh, which had a greater
than 70 percent increase in average annual build-
ing permits between these two periods, and
Columbus, which had a 15 percent increase, all
13 other cities experienced a decrease in building
permits between these two periods.
To generate stronger evidence, Oates and
Schwab also used an econometric model to test
the impact of structural change that may have
occurred in 1979-80 when the city of Pittsburgh
Cohen and Coughlin
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MAY/JUNE 2005 367
Table 2
Percent Change in Average Annual Value of


















SOURCE: Oates and Schwab (1997, Table 3).
15 For the details of property tax rates for all four counties in Hawaii,
see www.tfhawaii.org/taxes/property.html. 
16 Oates and Schwab also point out, however, that there was a major
Pittsburgh revitalization effort (Renaissance II) underway in the
late 1970s in an attempt to counteract the demise of the city’s
steel industry.increased the land/buildings tax differential. For
each of the 15 cities listed in Table 2, Oates and
Schwab ran regressions with the real value of
building permits against a constant and a dummy
variable. This dummy variable took a value of
zero for years prior to 1980 and a value of 1 for
1980 and later. They found that the coefficient
on the dummy variable was both positive and
statistically significant only in the regression for
the city of Pittsburgh.17
To present further evidence on the impact of
increasing the land/buildings tax rate differential,
Oates and Schwab looked at U.S. Census Bureau
data of the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
of these 15 cities over the years 1974-89. With
these data, they made a distinction between cities
and suburbs and between the real values of resi-
dential and nonresidential building permits. They
ran regressions with these Census data using the
same specifications as for the Dun and Bradstreet
data, with distinct regressions for residential, non-
residential, and office building permits for each
city and its respective suburbs. For the city of
Pittsburgh, the post-1979 dummy was significant
in the regressions for both the nonresidential and
office building permits, but insignificant for the
residential regression.18 For the Pittsburgh suburb
regressions, the post-1979 dummy in the residen-
tial permit regression was significant but negative;
this dummy was significant but positive in the
Pittsburgh suburban office regression, and insig-
nificant in the Pittsburgh suburban nonresidential
regression.19
These findings reveal a correlation between
the 1979-80 tax reforms in Pittsburgh and the
subsequent increases in building permits. As men-
tioned above, however, these findings are far from
definitive in light of public finance theory and the
specifics of the tax reform in Pittsburgh (that is,
the fact that the tax on buildings was unchanged
when the tax on land was raised).20
Short-Run Initial Effects
Because Virginia is a state whose citizens
have shown much interest in two-rate taxation,
Bowman and Bell (2004) used data on individual
property parcels from three Virginia locations to
estimate property tax liabilities using a tax in
which only the unimproved land is taxed. Conse-
quently, Bowman and Bell were able to identify
the initial change in the real property tax liabili-
ties of taxpayers resulting from a shift to a pure
land tax, a limiting case of two-rate taxation, from
the current uniform tax on land and improve-
ments. The three areas examined vary substan-
tially from each other. Roanoke, a city of roughly
100,000 residents, has been slowly losing popula-
tion, yet has experienced job growth. Chesterfield
County, a bedroom county in the Richmond area
with over 250,000 residents, has grown both in
terms of population and jobs. Highland County,
a small rural county of less than 2,500 residents,
has experienced declines in both population and
jobs.
Regardless of the area, Bowman and Bell
found that owners of properties with high land-
to-improvements ratios will tend to experience
an increase in their tax liabilities with the move
to two-rate taxation, while owners of properties
with low land-to-improvements ratios will tend
to experience a decrease in their tax liabilities.
Generally speaking, owners of residential property,
especially owners of multi-unit housing proper-
ties, would tend to benefit. In addition, the
researchers found that, even within a specific
classification of land use, substantial differences
in distributional effects were likely.
Simulation Studies
The limited use of two-rate taxation has moti-
vated a number of informative simulation studies
20 The Pittsburgh City Council removed the two-rate system in
2000. Craig (2003) reports that construction spending in the city
was higher in the two years prior to rescission than the two years
after. Construction activity in the city was also lower than in the
surrounding suburbs and in the United States as a whole after the
rescission.
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17 Oates and Schwab also looked at a slight variation of the afore-
mentioned model, which included a time trend in addition to the
other variables. They found that the coefficient on the post-1979
dummy variable was positive and statistically significant only in
the Pittsburgh and Buffalo regressions.
18 The signs and significance of these variables are the same for the
similar specifications that include time trends.
19 Once again, the signs and significance of these variables are robust
to the inclusion of a time trend in these regressions.to generate information about its potential effects.
It is important to stress, similar to Kodrzycki
(1998), some important caveats about simulation
studies. Computable general equilibrium models,
which provide the foundation for simulation
studies, provide a range of answers to policy
questions because the appropriate structure of
the underlying model and the choice of parameter
values are subject to much uncertainty.21 Here
we focus on three studies. These studies provide
insights into the economic consequences of
land value and two-rate taxation in a variety of
situations.
Nechyba (2001) has explored the economic
impacts of land tax reforms for each U.S. state as
well as for an average state. Numerous revenue-
neutral reforms were examined; in other words,
the increase in revenues from increased taxes on
unimproved land exactly matches the decrease in
tax revenues from reducing some distortionary
tax on capital or labor. Generally speaking, based
on the likely change in land prices, Nechyba
found that reforms eliminating entire classes of
taxes are feasible in nearly all states. The political
prospects for passing a specific reform are better
in states with high per capita taxes and low per
capita incomes and when the reform is targeted
to lowering taxes on capital rather than labor. In
addition, reforms targeted to lowering taxes on
capital cause either increases in land prices or
modest declines, while reforms targeted to lower-
ing taxes on labor tend to cause large declines in
land prices.
The second study we examine was done by
England (2003). He undertook a simulation study
using county-level data that examined a revenue-
neutral shift for New Hampshire from a uniform
property tax to a land value tax. The shift of the
tax burden from capital to land reduces the dispos-
able income of owners of land, some of which is
likely borne by nonresidents. The reduction in
disposable income leads to reduced consumer
spending on items other than housing services.
These impacts, however, are more than offset by
the changes set in motion by the decline in the
cost of owning residential buildings as well as
commercial and industrial capital. As a result,
residential construction and business investment
spending are boosted. Overall, employment and
gross state product increase in New Hampshire,
both immediately and after ten years. Moreover,
each of New Hampshire’s ten counties is projected
to have higher output, income, employment, and
population a decade after the tax change. While
all counties benefit, the economic changes for the
county that benefits the most are roughly double
those of the county benefiting the least. 
The final study we examine was done by
Haughwout (2004), who estimates the conse-
quences for New York City of replacing its current
tax system with a land tax. Two situations are
examined. In one case all taxes are eliminated
with the exception of the land tax, which is main-
tained at its current rate. In the other case, the key
difference is that the tax rate on land is increased
so that total tax revenue is maintained.
In the first case, the distortions caused by
taxes are eliminated and overall tax burdens are
reduced. At the same time, tax revenues decline,
so the provision of public goods falls correspond-
ingly. Overall, New York City experiences substan-
tial increases in private output, private capital
stock, employment, land values, and population
and a substantial reduction in public good provi-
sion and per capita tax revenues.
In the second case, the tax rate on land is
increased substantially so that tax revenues are
maintained. Contrary to the first case, land prices
fall, due in part to the substantially higher land
tax rate. Public goods provision is maintained.
Similar to the first case, private output, private
capital stock, employment, and population rise
sharply.
The two cases examined by Haughwout pro-
duce a clear message. The potential gains from
eliminating the distortions stemming from the
taxation of capital and labor, especially in a city
in which existing tax rates are relatively high,
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21 For example, Kodrzycki (1998) highlights the importance of the
elasticity of substitution between land and capital, which is the
optimal response of the capital/land ratio to a change in the relative
prices of these inputs. When this elasticity equals 0.25, Nechyba
(1998) finds that the substitution of land taxes for capital taxes leads
to an increase of 43 percent in the capital/land ratio and 32 percent
in national output. Meanwhile, a higher value of this elasticity, 0.5,
is associated with a more than doubling of the capital/land ratio
and an 89 percent increase in national output.are quite large. Such a conclusion leads quite





In opposition to the theory and evidence of
the potential gains from using two-rate taxation,
a number of practical problems face a region that
decides to implement two-rate taxation. These
problems include valuing land accurately, deter-
mining the revenue potential of land value taxa-
tion, and providing sufficient public infrastructure
to support the increased economic activity. 
To impose different tax rates on improvements
to land and raw land, one must have estimates of
the value of the improvements and the value of
raw land. Netzer (1998), using an in-depth exam-
ination of land value data, concluded that non-
agricultural land values could not be trusted.
Moreover, the data were incomplete with respect
to timing and coverage. Therefore, practically
speaking, useful land value data for two-rate
taxation purposes do not exist.
As Mills (1998) has stressed, to preclude dis-
tortions, a land tax must be applied to the value
of land prior to any improvements. Defining
exactly what raw land is presents problems. When
a parcel of land is ready to be developed, it has
already been improved substantially. Preparing
land for development generally requires a number
of costly activities, such as clearing and leveling
the land, conducting environmental tests, survey-
ing, obtaining the required permits, and installing
underground infrastructure. Furthermore, the
value of raw land hinges on the state of technology
as well as on the state of urban and rural develop-
ment. For example, agricultural inventions have
affected the value of rural land, while construc-
tion innovations have affected the value of urban
land. It remains to be seen how developments in
information technology will affect land values.
The bottom line is that estimating the value of
raw land, which is likely to change over time, is
very challenging.
Even more challenging is the assessment of
land values of developed properties. With respect
to commercial property, Mills (1998) notes the
sites and the structures are owned by different
groups. The separate ownership is frequently
driven by tax considerations, with the site owned
by an untaxed organization and the structure
owned by a business in a high tax bracket that can
utilize the benefits of depreciation. In theory,
separate estimates of site and structure values of
developed properties could be generated using
an approach known as hedonic pricing. Such an
approach is commonly used to explain, in a statis-
tical sense, housing prices. The sales price of a
house is related to the characteristics of the house
(i.e., living space, number of bathrooms, age, etc.),
lot size, the neighborhood, and the community.
Applying hedonic pricing to commercial
properties is problematic. Difficulties would arise
because of a lack of agreement as to which charac-
teristics should be included, the paucity of trans-
actions, and the fact that many transactions are
not arms-length exchanges. Consequently, generat-
ing accurate estimates of raw land values, an
essential component of land taxation, is difficult;
uniform taxation may be preferred because it is
less costly to use than two-rate taxation.22 How-
ever, whether the additional administrative cost
is large or small is unclear. Netzer (1998) has noted
that, despite the fact that each parcel of land is
unique, the difference in value for adjacent parcels
is minimal, a fact that should ease the adminis-
trative burden. 
The absence of accurate land value data makes
it difficult to answer the question of whether land
value taxation would generate sufficient revenues
to be an important replacement for revenues from
conventional property taxes. Despite the lack of
land value data, Netzer (1998) and McGuire (1998)
find that Pittsburgh’s experience with two-rate
taxation suggests that land value taxation can
generate an adequate level of tax revenue. On the
other hand, Mills (1998) is doubtful. His reason-
ing is straightforward: Annual real estate taxes
are 1.5 to 2.0 percent of the market value of tax-
22 One way to overcome this problem, suggested by Anas (1998), is
to have the city purchase and demolish some buildings and then
sell the land.
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at most, 10 percent of property values. If site and
structure rents are capitalized at the same rate,
gross-of-tax site rents are, at most, 1 percent of
property values. Consequently, a 100 percent
land rent tax would not generate sufficient rev-
enue to replace the revenue from existing real
estate taxes.
A land tax rate of 100 percent of the land rent
is equivalent to land confiscation without assum-
ing the liabilities of ownership. Mills (1998) has
noted that courts have consistently ruled that
similar regulations or taxes require, based on the
Fifth Amendment, that owners be compensated
for their losses. Such a court decision would
negate the value of using the land tax. While it
is unlikely that proponents of two-rate taxation
would argue for a tax rate of 100 percent on land,
there remains a question as to what percentage
of land rent could be taxed away without sub-
stantially affecting an owner’s incentive to seek
the best use for the land. At some tax rate, major
misallocations of land use would result.
Another potential problem occurs as a result
of the increased economic activity that takes place,
assuming the successful implementation of land
taxation. The resulting increase in the building/
land and employment/land ratios would necessi-
tate increased infrastructure provided by govern-
ment, such as transportation facilities and schools.
Without transportation infrastructure, increased
traffic congestion could negate the potential bene-
fits of land taxation. The unanswered question is
whether the political process would be responsive
to the changed environment in the private sector.
In light of the increased activity, many would
downplay this situation as a problem, but rather
view it as an opportunity.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
TWO-RATE TAXATION
A strong case exists that two-rate taxation is
more efficient than, and thus preferable to, uni-
form taxation. A reasonable question is why
uniform taxation remains the norm. In addition
to the practical problems discussed in the preced-
ing section, a number of explanations have been
proposed. These explanations fall into either of
two general categories—one stressing that the
efficiency gains are likely to be elusive and another
stressing that opposition from those likely to be
harmed by the change to a two-rate system pre-
vents such a change.
Efficiency
We begin with a discussion of the arguments
based on efficiency. Lee (2003) has shown that
uniform taxation of land and capital may be more
efficient than the taxation of land only. This possi-
bility arises when some land in a taxing jurisdic-
tion is owned by nonresidents. In terms of public
policy, a specific jurisdiction is assumed to struc-
ture its fiscal policies in the interests of its resi-
dents. Thus, one might argue that tax policies are
made with minimal consideration for the well-
being of absentee owners because nonresidents
do not vote in the jurisdiction. One consequence
is that the jurisdiction taxes land excessively to
exploit absentee owners and the resulting funds
are used to overprovide public goods.23 One way
to mitigate the inefficiency of overtaxing land is
for a higher-level government to require jurisdic-
tions to tax land and capital at a uniform rate.
This is what occurs in the United States because
most state governments do not allow lower-level
governments to deviate from uniform taxation.
Another argument suggesting the desirability
of uniform taxation has been made by Wildasin
and Wilson (1998). They start with the observation
that the returns to land are risky under production
uncertainty. This feature of the economy provides
an incentive for individuals to diversify their risk
by owning land in multiple jurisdictions. How-
ever, if each jurisdiction eliminates the rent on
owning land with 100 percent tax rates on land,
the benefits of diversification are eliminated.
23 Public goods, according to Rosen (1995, p. 61), are goods charac-
terized by “non-rival consumption.” Nonrival consumption exists
when one person’s consumption of the good does not reduce its
availability to anyone else. Common examples are national defense,
lighthouses, roads, and parks. Note that for roads and parks, at
some point, as more and more individuals attempt to enjoy the
services of roads and parks congestion costs arise; when this occurs,
consumption is no longer nonrival.
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from diversification and may be superior to the
pure land tax.
Opposition
The argument that political opposition would
mount against the change from uniform taxation
to two-rate taxation is straightforward. The change
in taxation will create winners and losers. Owners
of properties with high land-to-improvements
ratios (e.g., car dealerships) will tend to experience
an increase in their tax liabilities with the move
to two-rate taxation, while owners of properties
with low land-to-improvements ratios (e.g., high-
rise office buildings) will tend to experience a
decrease in their tax liabilities. The owners of sub-
stantial amounts of land are likely to be wealthy
and may have a disproportionate voice in the
political process and, thus, prevent a change that
would harm them.
The preceding discussion suggests that com-
munities with heterogeneous consumer prefer-
ences and incomes might be unlikely candidates
to adopt a land tax. On the other hand, more
homogeneous areas, such as a suburban commu-
nity, are more likely candidates for adoption.
However, as Hamilton (1976) and Fischel (1998)
have noted, these more homogeneous communi-
ties are also likely to be less afflicted by distor-
tionary taxes.
A fundamental question concerns how two-
rate taxation can be introduced so as to reduce the
political opposition. England (2004) runs simu-
lations using tax parcel data and shows that the
opposition to tax reform will likely be reduced if,
as part of the introduction of two-rate taxation,
uniform property tax credits are also introduced.
Before completing our discussion concerning
opposition to two-rate taxation, a few points about
the knowledge of policymakers are warranted. A
lack of understanding of two-rate taxation on the
part of political leaders likely is not a reason for
the limited use of the two-rate tax in states and
localities in the United States. Brunori (2004) con-
ducted a survey of state, county, and city officials
and received about 1200 responses. The results
indicate that between 65 and 70 percent of the
respondents were “very or somewhat familiar”
with land value taxation, and about 65 to 67 per-
cent of these political leaders responded the same
for the two-rate tax. About 76 percent of city and
county government officials and over 62 percent
of state lawmakers thought that a two-rate tax
would enhance economic development. Accord-
ing to Brunori, over 40 percent of political leaders
who responded held a common “misperception”
that the two-rate tax system would lead to greater
sprawl, due to additional building on undeveloped
suburban land stemming from the reduction in
the tax rate on structures. 
CONCLUSION
Proponents of two-rate taxation stress that
the taxation of real property involves two taxes.
One falls on man-made capital, such as buildings,
while the other falls on land, which is provided
by nature. The taxation of capital tends to deter its
formation. The higher the tax rate is in a specific
location, the larger the incentive for investors to
direct their capital elsewhere. The taxation of
land, however, does not deter either the formation
of land or encourage its relocation because land is
essentially fixed in quantity and immobile. There-
fore, the taxation of land does not generate the
changes in behavior that one sees with the taxa-
tion of capital. This differential effect of taxation
provides a justification for real property taxation
that taxes buildings and land at different rates. 
The theoretical gains associated with a 
revenue-neutral movement from single-rate taxa-
tion of real property to two-rate taxation are sub-
ject to little controversy.  Gains arise in the form
of declines in the deadweight losses associated
with taxation and increases in overall economic
activity. Parcels of land within a city would tend
to be used more productively. However, the size
of the gains associated with specific two-rate pro-
posals is subject to much uncertainty. For example,
the study of Pittsburgh’s experience with two-rate
taxation by Oates and Schwab (1997) and a num-
ber of simulation studies have suggested that the
gains can be substantial. On the other hand, the
paucity of experience with two-rate taxation, the
sensitivity of the results of simulation studies to
the underlying model’s structure and the choice
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istrative feasibility raise questions about the size
of the gains that could be realized. 
The majority of legislators are familiar with
the theoretical consequences of two-rate taxation.
However, the fact that few regions use two-rate
taxation reflects the existence of significant obsta-
cles. First, the practical implementation of two-
rate taxation complicates the assessment process
because the value of land must be separated from
the value of improvements. Second, significant
political opposition to two-rate taxation arises
because the change to two-rate taxation causes
some individuals to suffer adverse distributional
consequences; generally speaking, owners of
property with high land-to-improvement ratios
tend to be harmed, while owners of property with
low land-to-improvement ratios tend to benefit.
In light of these consequences, policies that miti-
gate the adverse effects, yet allow for the capture
of the economic gains, are required to reduce the
opposition to two-rate taxation and increase the
prospects for adoption.
Given the current system of taxation in the
United States, pressures for using two-rate taxation
will likely continue to emerge at the local level.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the opin-
ions of Nobel Prize winners Milton Friedman
and William Vickrey concerning land taxation
will become widely held by legislators and voters.
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